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NOTE AND COMMENT
THn CY-Pxs DocRmi-.-The court of chancery of New Jersey in the
recent case of Browzw et aL. v. Condit et al. (Sept. 30, 19o5), 61 Atl. Rep.
io5, refused to apply this doctrine under the following circumstances: The
will of one Susan M. Corson, bearing date July 7, 1897, disposed of her
residuary estate "to the Hospital Fund for Sick Seamen at Navy Yard, Brook-
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lyn, New York, care of Mr. John M. Wood, chaplain." It appears that neither
at the time of the making of the will nor at any time thereafter was there a
fund in existence at or in any way connected with the Brooklyn, New York,
Navy Yard that could properly be designated as a "fund for sick seamen."
Nor was the said John M. Wood, at the time of the making the will or
thereafter a chaplain at said navy yard in any proper sense of the term. He
was, however, for several years previous *to his death, which took place about
a year after the date of the will and about the same time prior to the death
of the testatrix, engaged more or less in missionary work at the said navy
yard under the auspices of the American Seamen's Friend Society. His
duties consisted chiefly in holding religious meetings, and although he had
no official connection with the government hospital located at the said navy
yard, he had, as stated in the opinion of the court, "the privilege of minister-
ing to the sick sailors in the hospital, presumably to such extent as his services
were acceptable to them." Similar privileges were given to the representa-
tives of other benevolent societies. On several occasions, whether before or
after the making of her will does not appear, Mrs. Corson sent to Mr. Wood
small sums of money with directions, in each instance, that he should with
the money get delicacies and flowers for the sick sailors. The court found
nothing in the evidence to show that the testatrix was ever interested in any
charitable work at the said navy yard except as it was connected with Mr.
Wood. After the death of the latter the American Seamen's Friend Society
continued its work at the navy yard through other lay missionaries. It
appeared, also, that the International Committee of Young Men's Christian
Associations, one of the defendants in the case, in March, i899, established
a branch for charitable work among the sailors in the Brooklyn, New York,
Navy Yard, their work being of the same kind as that carried on by the
American Seamen's Friend Society, but apparently somewhat wider in its
scope.
A bill for the construction of this will was filed by the executors, and
besides the heirs and next of kin. of testatrix, the International Committee
of Young Men's Christian Associations, the Americarn Seamen's Friend
Society, and the United States of America were made .defendants. The
Attorney General of the State was made a party at the.suggestion of the
court. The heirs and next of kin answered, "claiming the entire residuary
estate upon the. theory that the residuary devise and bequest lapsed." The
International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations answered,
and, after describing their charitable work in connection with seamen at the
said navy yard, offered to take the residuary fund and apply it according to
the charitable purpose of the testatrix. The bill was taken as confessed
against the other defendants.
The court held that the charitable donation lapsed and that the residuary
estate could not be devoted to charitable purposes through the instrumen-
tality of the cy-pres doctrine. This conclusion was based upon the propo-
sition that the provision in the will, construed in the light of surrounding
facts and circumstances, did not show a general charitable intent such as
would be necessary for the application of the cy-pres doctrine, but a par-
ticular charitable intent to be exercised in a-particular way and through the
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instrumentality of a designated agency. The court argued that because there
was no evidence that the testatrix "ever visited the Brooklyn Navy Yard, or
that she had any connection whatever with the sick seamen at that navy yard,
or its hospital, excepting through Mr. Wood whom she knew and with whom
she corresponded," and because it appeared further that her only contribu-
tions to said seamen during her life were made through Mr. Wood, it is
proper to conclude that this missionary was an essential factor in the accom-
plishment of her charitable purposes. "It seems to me," says the court,
"that this charitable bequest must be construed practically in the same
way as if it had been in the form of a gift to Mr. Wood, to be expended by
him as an incident to his missionary work for the benefit of. the sick seamen
in -the hospital of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, with whiom he came in personal
contact. It might also, in other words, be described as a testamentary chari-
table effort to support Mr. Wood's personal dispensation of flowers and deli-
cacies among the sick seamen to whom he ministered as a religious teacher.
* * * I do not think that Mrs. Corson contemplated any dispensation
of this legacy except through the personal efforts of Mr. Wood." The
court bases its conclusion upon the proposition, which is sustained by abun-
dant authority, that where it is apparent that it is a testator's purpose that
his charitable intent, which is special and particular, shall be carried out
through a designated agency and through no other, and that agency fails, the
gift lapses.
But there would seem to be room for a difference of opinion as to the
nature of the charitable intent in this case and as to the purpose of the tes-
tatrix in regard to the carrying out of this intent. The doctrine is elementary
that where there is a general charitable intent apparent and that intent can-
not be carried out in the manner directed in the will, the agency for the appli-
cation of the charity not being of the essence of the gift, a court of equity
may, cy-pres, where the principles of cy-pres are recognized, authorize the
administration of the fund through a similar agency. Weeks v. Hobson, 15o
Mass. 377, 6 L. R. A. i47; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539. But what is a
general charitable intent? Is it necessarily confined to those cases in which
the entire property of a testator is to be devoted to charitable purposes or in
which there is an intent to devote a part of the property to charity generally?
Or may there be what the law calls a general charitable intent where the
charity is to be applied within certain well-defined lines? Answers to these
questions and also a statement of the equitable principles that might well be
held to govern this case, are to be found in the following quotation from
the opinion of MR. JUSTICZ KAY, affirmed on appeal, in the case of Biscoe v.
fackson, L. R. 35 Ch. Div. (1887), 46o, 463, 464: "I quite agree that if the
mode of application is such an essential part of the gift that you cannot dis-
tinguish any general purpose of charity, but are obliged to say that that mode
of doing a charitable act was the only one the testator intended, or at all con-
templated, and that he had no general intention. of giving his money to
charity, then the court cannot, if the particular mode of doing it fails, apply
the money cy-pres. On the other hand, if you do see a general intention of
benefiting a certain class or number of people, who come within the ordinary
definition of objects of charity, and you find that the particular mode the
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testator has contemplated of doing this cannot be carried out, and you are
convinced that 'the mode is not so essential that you cannot separate the inten-
tion of charity from that particular mode, then the court says -there is a
general intention of charity, and as the mode has failed, the duty of the
court is, favoring charity as the court always does. to provide another mode
than that which the testator has pointed out and which has failed." In this
case a testator directed his trustees to set apart out of his personal estate that
might by law be bequeathed for charitable purposes, a sum of money to be
applied in a designated way in the establishment of a soup kitchen and cot-
tage hiospital for the parish of S. It becoming impossible to apply the
funds exactly as directed in the will, the court held that the will indicated a
general charitable intent to benefit the poor of the designated parish, and that,
although the bequest could not be carried out in the manner directed in the
will, the court would execute the trust cy-pres.
. The case under review is not unlike that of Biscoc v. Jackson, and it might
well be argued that the same principles should apply. The case is not one of
a bequest to an institution that never existed or that no longer exists, which
bequest would undoubtedly lapse. Nor does it seem to be one where the
instrumentality selected is of the essence of the bequest. It might well be
argued that a general charitable intent to benefit the sick seamen ii the Brook-
lyn Navy Yard is manifested in the residuary clause of this will; that from
the language used, it is apparent that the testatrix had "a general intention of
benefiting a certain class or number of people, who come within the ordinary
definition of objects of charity," Biscoe v. Jackson, supra, namely, sick sea-
men at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.. The testatrix evidently supposed that
there was a fund for sick seamen at this navy yard, aid that it was adminis-
tered by this Mr. Wood, but there is nothing in the language of the residuary
clause to indicate that it was her intention that the sick seamen should receive
the benefit of her bounty only through the instrumentality of Mr. Wood.
Her predominant purpose, as indicated by her language, is the, benefit of
the sick seamen; the agency for the carrying out of this purpose is an inci-
dent. The testatrix did not indicate either by words or acts that she had
selected this man because of his special qualities and that no one else should
act. It may be suggested in this connection that the fact that during her
lifetime she made several remittances to Mr. Wood "to get delicacies for the
sick boys and flowers," if properly in the case, should not be of the controll-
ing significance accorded to it by the court, as showing an intention on her
part that her charity should be administered only through Mr. Wood. It
might well be argued thit such acts, taken in connection with the language of
the residuary clause, simply indicate a general charitable intent to benefit a
certain class of people. It appears that Mr. Wood died about a year after the
making of the will and about a year before the death of the testatrix. The
fact of there having been no change made in the residuary clause after the
death of Mr. Wood, although not atluded to by the court in the published
opinion, would seem to be of special significance as bearing upon the attitude
of the testatrix in regard to the administration of her bounty. And another
fact that is significant 'as bearing upon the question of charitable intent, is
that in the paragraph of the will immediately preceding the residuary lause,
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the testatrix disposes of .the claims upon her bounty of those who must take
if the charitable donation is held to lapse, by declaring that as to them she
feels no responsibility at they will upon her death, inherit the entire estate of
her father, and that she, therefore, gives to each of them five dollars.
There is ample American authority for the conclusion that such a chari-
table intention as is disclosed in this case may be made effectual through the
application of the cy-pres doctrine. In Winslow v Cummings, 3 Cush. 358, a
bequest to "the Marine Bible Society," there being no society of that name,
was sustained and a trustee appointed tc dispose of the legacy in accordance
with the intention of the testator as found by the court. The case of Bliss v.
The American Bible Society, 2 Allen, 334, is to the same effect. Authority
of like import is :not wanting in New Jersey, the state in which the case
under review arose. A bequest to "The Bridgeton Trustees for Free
Schools," the income "to be applied annually for ages, as far as may be prac-
ticable for the tuition of poor children, without regard to denomination or
color, in the elements of English literature" was sustained as a charitable
bequest in McBride v. Elmer's Executors, 6 N. J. Eq. (2 Hal. Ch.) 1o7, and
trustees were appointed for its execution, although there was no such body as
the one named, the trustees of public schools (usually called free schools)
being the only school trustees in the town of Bridgeton. In The New
York Annual Conference Ministers' Mutual Association Society v. Executors
of Clarkson, 8 N. J. Eq. (4 Hal. Ch., 541, a bequest to the "New York Metho-
dist Conference Society for the suppoft of old worn-out preachers," was sus-
tained as a charity, although there was no such society as the one described,
and turned over to the complainant society as the one intended by the tes-
tatrix. The general attitude of the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
in regard to the interpretation of charitable bequests is shown to be a liberal
one in Hesketh v. Murphy, 36 N. J. Eq. 3o4, the court in the opinion citing
with approval 'the last two cases. In Kerrigan v. Tabb (N. J. Ch.), 39 At.
Rep. 7oi, a legacy to a Catholic priest to be expended for masses for the
repose of testatrix's soul was sustained as a bequest to a charitable use, and
was held not to lapse upon the death of the trustee before the death of the
testatrix, and it was further held that another trustee should be appointed to
carry out the trust.
The court, in the case under review, is clearly of the opinion that in New
Jersey the cy-pres doctrine, as ordinarily understood, can receive little or no
recognition; and yet, Sept. 22, 1905, eight days previous to the decision in this
case, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in MacKenzie v. Trustees
of Presbytery of Jersey City, 6i At. Rep. io27, in a scholarly and well-reas-
oned opinion, settled affirmatively and apparently beyond controversy, the
question of the existence in the state of the doctrine as understood and applied
in those states in which it has been accorded a liberal recognition. The case
was one in which a provision in a deed for the benefit of a church society,
although in the form of 'a condition, was held to create a charitable trust
which could be carried out through the instrumentality of the cy-pres doctri te,
if 'it should, upon a future consideration of the facts in a suit suggested by the
court, be found necessary to resort to that doctrine. In the course of the
opinion, after a general consideration of the cy-pres doctrine, the court says:
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"The objection to the doctrine of cy-pres because of the excesses which have
been committed in its name (for the most part when applied by the Chancellor
of England, acting under the sign manual of the crown, rather than as a
judge of a court of equity), is no longer to be regarded as of weight. Modern
decisions have pruned the judicial doctrine so far as it may have needed
pruning, and have confined it within sensible limits. The sound rule now is,
at least in America, that courts will not execute charitable trusts in a manner
different from that intended, unless the intent cannot in the original mode be
literally carried out; that they will preserve the substance, although the-mode
be departed from; and that they will not presume or invent an intention
which the testator or donor has not fairly indicated." In connection with a
review of some of the leading New Jersey cases upon the subject, the court
says that "it can scarcely be denied that our courts have already accepted the*
cy-pres doctrine in its essence, although they have not labeled it with the
name." * * * "On the whole," the court concludes, "we affirm that the
judicial doctrine of cy-pres, as pruned and restrained by modern authorities,
English and American, and as affected by our own decisions, has a proper
place in our jurisprudence, and that after a proper inquiry, it may, if neces-
sary, be applied to the management of the estate or fund in question." In
connection with the discussion, the court, quotes approvingly the following
from the opinion of the Chancellor in Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of
Art et al., 65 N. 3. Eq. ii, =, s5 Atl. Rep. 468, 472, which we give here as
bearing upon the general proposition discussed in the case under review: "If
trustees disclose a situation of their trust in which a slavish adherence to the
terms of the trust will operate wholly to prevent the benefits intended by its
creator, and they seek instructions and directions as to their duty, I think
that instructions and directions for a course of conduct which, though differ-
ent from that prescribed by the'terms of the trust, will actually carry out the
intent of the creator, may well be grounded upon and sustained by the neces-
sity of the case. The benefits intended for the beneficiaries are the main
su bjce.ts of consideration. The modes in which those benefits may be attained
are incidental, and necessity may require a change of mode in order to pro-
duce the intended effect." As sustaining in a general way the charitable
donation in the case under review, see lames Schouler, Petitioner, 134 Mass.
426; Russell v. Allen, lO7 U. S. 163; Academy of Visitation v. Clemens, So
Mo. 167; Cromie'Ws Heirs v. Louisville Orphans' Home Society, 3 Bush. (Ky.)
36s. H. B. H.
